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Abstract 
Museum visitors are an ideal population for assessing the persistence of the conceptual barriers that 
make it difficult to grasp Darwinian evolutionary theory. In comparison with other members of the 
public, they are more likely to be interested in natural history, have higher education levels, and be 
exposed to the relevant content. If museum visitors do not grasp evolutionary principles, it seems 
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unlikely that other members of the general public would do so. In the current study, 32 systemati-
cally selected visitors to three Midwest museums of natural history provided detailed open-ended 
explanations of biological change in seven diverse organisms. They were not told that these were 
evolutionary problems. Responses were coded as: informed naturalistic reasoning, featuring some 
understanding of key evolutionary concepts, novice naturalistic reasoning, featuring intuitive expla-
nations that are also present in childhood, and creationist reasoning, featuring supernatural explana-
tions. All visitors were mixed reasoners, using one or more of these patterns in different 
permutations across the seven organisms: 72% used a combination of informed naturalistic reason-
ing and novice naturalistic reasoning, while a further 28% added creationist reasoning to this mix. 
Correlational analyses indicated that for many visitors these reasoning patterns were coherent rather 
than fragmented. The theoretical model presented in this article contributes to an analysis of the 
developmental and cultural factors associated with these patterns. This could help educators work-
ing in diverse educational settings understand how to move visitors and students toward more in-
formed reasoning patterns. 
 
Keywords: evolution, museums, conceptual change, intuitive beliefs, creationist beliefs, cognitive 
development, culture 
 
An understanding of evolution and of the importance of evolution research is central to 
scientific literacy today. Without this foundation, members of the public are unlikely to 
grasp many of the health and environmental issues of our time (e.g., Nesse &Williams, 
1996). Furthermore, modern theories of evolution provide the basic principles for under-
standing a broad array of topics from biology to medicine, psychology, and climate 
change. Yet, surveys and more focused studies indicate that about 50% of Americans are 
unlikely to accept, let alone understand, the evolutionary principles of descent with mod-
ification and natural selection, as evidenced by their belief that humans originated through 
supernatural agency (Almquist & Cronin, 1988; Gallup, 2007; Numbers, 1992, 2003). 
Among industrialized nations, the U.S. ranks second to last in acceptance of evolution 
(Miller, Scott, & Okomoto, 2006). 
Even among those who endorse evolution, misunderstandings occur (e.g., Sinatra, 
Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003; Smith & Siegel, 2004); numerous studies 
demonstrate that students who apparently accept the idea of evolutionary origins rou-
tinely misunderstand natural selection, construing evolutionary change in pre-Darwinian 
terms, instead (e.g., Evans, 2000, 2001; Banet & Ayuso, 2003; Bishop & Anderson, 1990; 
Brumby, 1984; Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985a,b; Dagher & BouJaoude, 1997; Good, 
1992; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Shtulman, 2006). Such findings sug-
gest a substantive failure on the part of public education to provide an adequate founda-
tion for comprehending evolutionary theory. Some of this failure can be traced to widely 
publicized anti-evolution movements (e.g., Scott & Matzke, 2007), whose persistent efforts 
have resulted in state standards that de-emphasize the role of evolution in science (Beards-
ley, 2004; Lerner, 2000) and teachers who feel anxious about including evolution in the 
curriculum (Griffith & Brem, 2004). 
Although much of the difficulty accepting evolution is frequently related to deeply held 
religious beliefs (Mazur, 2005; Numbers 1992), we take a somewhat different approach in 
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this article. We argue that such widespread problems in both acceptance and understand-
ing stem not only from these cultural influences but also from the intuitive reasoning pro-
cesses that constrain children’s grasp of biological phenomena (Bloom & Weisberg, 2007; 
Evans, 2000, 2001). Thus, a central purpose of this study is to investigate whether intuitive 
beliefs that appear early in childhood persist in adult populations, impeding adults’ grasp 
of evolution (Evans, 2001, 2008). More specifically, we examine (1) patterns of explanation: 
in particular, the extent to which adults use intuitive reasoning alone or with evolutionary 
or creationist reasoning and (2) the coherence of such reasoning patterns. A clearer under-
standing of the nature of these intuitive reasoning processes and the role they play in adult 
reasoning should provide a better foundation for more effective interventions in diverse 
educational settings. The studies reported in this article build on the considerable body of 
research, cited earlier, demonstrating that students of all ages misconstrue evolution. It 
extends this research by providing and testing a developmental and cultural framework 
for understanding the origin and persistence of these ideas. 
Our focus here is on museum visitors because they provide an ideal population for as-
sessing the persistence of intuitive reasoning patterns that limit an understanding of Dar-
winian evolution. According to the National Science Board (2008), 60% of adults have 
visited an informal science setting, such as a natural history or science museum, in the 
previous year. Museum visitors are more highly educated than the population at large 
(Korn, 1995) and are less likely to endorse creationist ideas (Spiegel, Evans, Gram, & Dia-
mond, 2006). Most importantly, they are interested enough in natural history to voluntarily 
visit such museums; thus, any misunderstandings on their part are not likely to be at-
tributed to a mere lack of exposure to the relevant content. As research institutions, natural 
history museums house the evidence that helps scientists describe the world’s biodiversity 
and understand the evolution of life. Sharing that perspective with a public audience is the 
mission of most natural history museums and drives their exhibits on evolution (Diamond 
& Scotchmoor, 2006). If museum visitors do not grasp evolutionary principles, it seems 
unlikely that other members of the general public would do so. 
The only systematic study of visitors’ understanding of evolution (Macfadden et al., 
2007) to date, indicates that U.S. museum visitors do have difficulties, but that study fo-
cused on a single problem, microevolutionary change in cheetahs (Bishop & Anderson, 
1990), with a limited analysis of visitors’ concepts. In the current study, we profile visitors’ 
reasoning about the evolution of seven organisms that were to be featured in Explore Evo-
lution, an NSF-funded exhibition developed to make evolution accessible to young people 
and the public (Diamond & Evans, 2007; Diamond, Spiegel, Meier, & Disbrow, 2004). The 
focus of the exhibition was seven contemporary research projects that have made major 
contributions to a scientific understanding of evolution. These included studies of HIV 
evolution, the emergence of a new diatom species, fungus-growing ants and their coevolv-
ing partners, sexual selection among Hawaiian flies, variation in the Galapagos finches, 
the genetic ties between humans and chimps, and fossilized walking whales. These re-
search projects were selected because they illustrate a common set of evolutionary princi-
ples in organisms ranging from the microscopic to the largest of all mammals. In addition, 
these projects include examples of small-scale and large-scale evolutionary change, repre-
senting both micro- and macro-evolutionary processes. 
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In the current study, we assessed the utility of a particular theoretical framework for 
understanding museum visitors’ reasoning about the evolution of this broad range of or-
ganisms. We first provide an overview and later use it to articulate a focused set of research 
questions. 
 
Theoretical Framework: An Overview 
 
Central to the current framework are three major sources of ideas about biological change 
(see fig. 1; Evans, 2005). Intuitive or commonsense reasoning comprises the everyday ex-
planations that most easily come to mind when humans solve problems (see Evans, 2008). 
Countering these intuitive biases, the scientific and religious communities provide the two 
primary cultural sources of information about evolution, communicated through schools, 
museums, churches, and the media. In the case of religion, the most influential U.S. source 
is Biblical literalism whose adherents believe that God created each species individually a 
few thousand years ago (Numbers, 1992). According to a 2007 Gallup Poll, about 46% of 
the U.S. public agree that God created humans in this way. This same poll indicated that 
another 36% accept some variation of theistic evolution, believing that biological evolution 
occurred over millions of years, with God guiding the process. Only 13% agree that God 
played no role in biological evolution. This pattern of agreement is virtually unchanged 
over the past 20 years. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Reasoning about evolution—three major influences: intuitive reasoning, the 
scientific community, and the religious community. 
 
The commonsense or everyday reasoning of the visitor, however, remains as the more 
pervasive source of influence. From studies in cognitive science and cognitive anthropol-
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ogy, several intuitive reasoning modes (see fig. 1) have been identified that are hypothe-
sized to underlie human reasoning about the biological world, including an everyday or 
intuitive biology and an intuitive psychology (e.g., Atran, 1990; Carey, 1985; Gelman, 2003; 
Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Keil, 1994; Medin & Atran, 2004; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). These 
reasoning modes appear early in childhood and are associated with distinct cognitive bi-
ases that appear to make evolutionary ideas counterintuitive (Evans, 2000, 2001, 2008). The 
relevant biases are that living things are separate, stable, and unchanging, with an under-
lying causal nature or essence (essentialism) and that animate behavior is goal directed (tel-
eology) and intentional (theory of mind). From an evolutionary perspective, the biological 
world is neither stable nor purposeful. 
In the current study, we define novice naturalistic reasoning as the use of intuitive modes 
of reasoning. The communities of science and religion build on this intuitive base, resulting 
in informed naturalistic reasoning or creationist reasoning, respectively (see fig. 1; Evans, 2005). 
We apply the term informed naturalistic reasoning to reasoning patterns that are interme-
diate between those found in novices and in scientific experts. Visitors’ spontaneous evo-
cation of one or more of the VIST (variation, inheritance, selection, and time) evolutionary 
concepts is central to the informed reasoning pattern. The acronym VIST from the Univer-
sity of California Museum of Paleontology website (http://evolution.berkeley.edu) pro-
vided cognitive organizers for framing and remembering core evolutionary concepts in 
the exhibition. While novice naturalistic reasoners’ intuitive explanations are incorrect from 
a scientific standpoint, they are the precursors of the methodological naturalism of science. 
Both novice and informed naturalistic reasoners evoke natural causes (naturalism) and 
thus differ from creationist reasoners who evoke supernatural causes. This crucial distinc-
tion between natural and supernatural causation was invoked by Judge John Jones III in 
the Dover Trial, to explain his rejection of claims that ID (intelligent design) theory is sci-
entific (Mervis, 2006). 
 
Intuitive or Alternative Conceptions? 
Although their origins differ, the proposed theoretical framework maps on to a venerable 
tradition in science education research of alternative conceptions that pose barriers to science 
understanding (for a summary, see Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). While the alter-
native conception framework is rooted in Piagetian traditions, the current framework has 
its roots in contemporary post-Piagetian theories of domain-specific conceptual change 
(e.g., Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1998) as well as anthropological studies of folk biol-
ogies (e.g., Atran, 1990; Medin & Atran, 2004). Thus, the term “intuitive theories,” used 
throughout this article, references framework theories, the building blocks of children’s 
and adults’ everyday understanding of the world. Because they play a foundational role 
in conceptual development, in general we prefer to use the phrase intuitive conceptions 
rather than alternative conceptions. The latter will be used judiciously to refer to scientifi-
cally incorrect ideas that are meaningful in everyday reasoning (Wandersee et al., 1994). 
 
What Is Novice Naturalistic Reasoning? 
One of the main issues addressed in this study is whether visitors’ novice naturalistic rea-
soning is based, in part, on themes apparent in children’s intuitive theories of the biological 
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and psychological worlds. These themes appear in the alternative conceptions research on 
students’ understanding of evolution mentioned earlier. Although disagreements remain, 
the current consensus is that young elementary school children reason biologically rather 
than exclusively psychologically, albeit using a somewhat different framework than that 
used by adults (Carey, 1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). One lingering question is the extent 
to which children construe goal-directed action as intentional. Kelemen (1999, 2004) claims, 
for example, the young children are promiscuously teleological, ascribing purpose or func-
tion to natural phenomena, a capacity that is tied to their intuitive psychology. 
We agree that some form of teleological reasoning is foundational, and that it is often 
associated with intentional reasoning. However, based on research with infants (e.g., 
Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Woodward, 
2009), we argue that this is not necessarily the case. Further, we argue that in order to un-
derstand the nature of the precursors to evolutionary thinking, it is advantageous to parse 
these conceptual systems. School-aged children distinguish between functional explana-
tions that satisfy physiological needs, and mental state explanations that satisfy desires, 
even if they often default to the latter. Six- to seven-year-olds, for example, reason that 
animals and humans breathe because they need to, not because they want to (Poling & Ev-
ans, 2002). In this analysis, the concept of goal-directedness undergirds both an intuitive 
psychology and an intuitive biology. It is the reason behind the action that distinguishes 
the two conceptual systems. Accordingly, we assess whether, when explaining biological 
change, visitors utilize goal-directed explanations that reference the basic survival needs 
of the organism or/and intentional explanations that reference mental states. 
 
Pure or Mixed Reasoning Patterns? 
An intriguing issue concerns the adoption of what would appear to be contradictory 
frameworks, with about a third of the U.S. public espousing both evolutionist and crea-
tionist ideas (Evans, 2000, 2001; Gallup, 2007). Many leaders in the theological and scien-
tific communities reject one stance and adopt the other, yet there is a lively debate as to the 
ways in which individuals can combine these stances (e.g., Evans, 2008; Scott, 2004). One 
resolution is theistic evolution, which can be construed as a causal chain with God as first 
cause, initiating the process of evolution. In the lay public’s reasoning, however, mixed 
models are more typical (Poling & Evans, 2004a). Typically, creationist explanations are 
more likely to be applied to humans than to other species (Evans, 2000, 2001; Sinatra et al., 
2003), with (pre-Darwinian) need-based evolutionary explanations more likely to be ap-
plied to species that are taxonomically distant from humans (Evans, 2008). In synthetic 
blends (Evans, Legare, & Rosengren, in press; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992), culturally avail-
able scientific or theological stances are fused with intuitive or novice explanations (the 
overlapping circles in fig. 1). 
Thus, a key research question is to what extent do natural history museum visitors 
adopt pure or mixed models to describe evolutionary change. Further, if mixed models are 
prevalent, a related question concerns their coherence. One of the premises of the frame-
work theory approach is that coherence is necessary; without this core characteristic such 
theories could not provide the foundation for children’s everyday explanations (e.g., 
Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Yet, there is an intense debate regarding the nature 
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of novices’ reasoning. Vosniadou and her colleagues argue that one of the main barriers to 
conceptual change in science education is the coherence of the underlying naive intuitive 
frameworks, which arise from ontological commitments that differ radically from those of 
scientific theories (Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008). An alternative position is 
that the novice’s knowledge base in any domain consists of discrete unconnected elements 
and that coherence is achieved only as a function of science instruction (diSessa, 2008). In 
this study, we shall assess whether specific concepts or themes within visitors’ reasoning 
patterns are correlated: If they are, then this would lend support to the coherence hypoth-
esis; alternatively, the fragmentation argument (diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004) would 
be supported if targeted themes are uncorrelated. One prediction, stemming from the 
above analyses of children’s explanations, was that need-based reasoning would present a 
unique pattern of significant intercorrelations in adults. 
 
Study Overview: Parts I and II 
 
Visitors were recruited from three Midwest natural history museums where the Explore 
Evolution exhibition was to be installed. Importantly, because this study was carried out 
prior to the advance publicity or installation, study participants had no exposure to the 
exhibition content, nor were they told that it was about evolution. Thus, this study is 
unique in examining whether visitors would spontaneously apply evolutionary concepts, 
even when they were not cued to do so. Visitors were asked to explain seven problems (see 
table 1), each of which focused on one of the organisms central to the work of each of the 
scientists featured in the exhibition. Although each problem appeared to be different, they 
could all be answered using the same evolutionary principles. (In pilot work, an expert 
remarked that he would respond similarly to each question.) 
 
Table 1. The seven evolutionary problems presented to museum visitors 
VIRUS: I’m going to tell you about a person who has the virus called HIV. You may know that this virus 
causes the disease called AIDS. Here is a picture of the HIV virus greatly enlarged (give illustration to subject). 
This virus is in a child called George. Now scientists can read the genetic material of a virus to tell what kind 
it is. When the scientists first looked at George’s virus, he had three varieties of HIV, each slightly different. 
Later, when the scientists went back to check on George’s viruses again, there were now 5 types of HIV. De-
scribe how you think George came to have the new kinds of HIV viruses. 
DIATOM: Yellowstone Lake is in the middle of Yellowstone National Park (show map). There are many types 
of algae in this lake. However, scientists have found a kind of algae in this lake that is not found anywhere 
else (show diatom photo). These algae first appeared about 14,000 years ago. At that time, the climate was warm-
ing. Describe how you think this new kind of algae came to be in Yellowstone Lake. 
ANT/FUNGUS: Scientists have learned about a kind of ant that looks after a special type of fungus in “ant 
farms” (show picture). The ants eat the fungus and this type of ant and the fungus have had this relationship 
for millions of years. However, there is another type of fungus that attacks the farms. But, the ant carries 
around bacteria that protect the farms from the attacking fungus. These four organisms have been living to-
gether for many millions of years. Describe how you think this partnership came about. 
FRUIT FLIES: There were once no fruit flies on Hawaii (show map). Then, about 8 million years ago, a few fruit 
flies landed on one of the islands. Now there are 800 different kinds of fruit flies in Hawaii (show photos of flies). 
How would you explain this? 
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FINCHES: The Galapagos Islands are located off the coast of South America (show map of chain). On one of 
these islands, scientists have been studying one kind of finch. Here is a picture of this finch (photo has more 
than one ground finch). The scientists measure the size of the finch’s beak (show picture). On their first trip to the 
island, the scientists found that most of the beaks of this finch were on the small side. Then a severe drought 
occurred on the island, and it wiped out most of the plants that make the small seeds that the finches feed on. 
The only seeds that were common were really tough seeds that require a large beak to open. Then the scientists 
came back a few years later and measured the beaks again. This time, they found that most of the beaks were 
on the large side. How would you explain that on their return trip to the island, larger beaks were found on 
more of the finches? 
HUMAN/CHIMP: Here is a picture of a human being and a picture of a chimpanzee (show photographs). Sci-
entists think that humans and chimps shared a common ancestor as recently as 5 million years ago. Describe 
how you think that both a chimp and a human could arise from the same kind of ancestor. 
WHALE/HIPPO: Here is a picture of a new kind of whale that was found in the desert in the Middle East 
(show cover of Science). Scientists believe that this whale shares a common ancestor with hippos (show photo of 
hippo). Describe how you think that both a whale and a hippo could arise from the same kind of ancestor. 
 
In line with the above theoretical perspective, visitors’ explanations were coded into 
three reasoning patterns: novice naturalistic, informed naturalistic, and creationist. Visi-
tors could evoke a particular theme from any one of these patterns up to seven times (once 
for each of the seven organisms), giving us sufficient data to assess the intercorrelations 
between particular themes. Such a coding system required both top-down and bottom-up 
coding methods. The former corresponds to the nomothetic approach (Wandersee et al., 
1994), in which visitors’ explanations were compared with the scientific model, and the 
latter to idiographic approaches in which meaningful themes emerged during the coding 
process; coding was still constrained, however, by the conceptual framework. Data anal-
yses are reported in two parts, with Part I focused on the nature of visitors’ reasoning pat-
terns, to what extent they are pure or mixed, and Part II, on their coherence. The latter was 
addressed by examining correlations between targeted themes from the reasoning pat-
terns. This two-part examination of the data allowed us to obtain detailed knowledge of 
visitors’ reasoning patterns, using a qualitative analysis, and to derive inferences regard-
ing their coherence, using a quantitative analysis (Miles & Huberman 1994). 
 
Research Predictions 
Based on prior research and our theoretical model, described earlier, one key research pre-
diction was that few museum visitors would endorse any one reasoning pattern exclu-
sively across all seven organisms; in fact, mixed patterns seemed likely to prevail (see the 
overlapping circles in fig. 1). Further, based on developmental research and theory, we 
also predicted that even if visitors endorsed mixed models, the pattern of intercorrelations 
between themes would be demonstrably coherent. 
For Part I analyses, specific research questions derived from the overall prediction that 
mixed reasoning patterns would predominate, were: (1) When reasoning about evolution-
ary problems, would museum visitors spontaneously evoke evolutionary concepts across 
all organisms? (2) To what extent would visitors use creationist and novice reasoning, as 
well? (3) Would the intuitive ideas evident in previous research on children’s and students’ 
reasoning about evolutionary problems be evident in museum visitors’ novice naturalistic 
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reasoning? Based on findings from earlier research (see Evans, 2008 for a summary), we 
predicted that themes from the novice reasoning pattern were more likely to be elicited by 
microscopic or invertebrate organisms and that to the extent that creationism would be 
apparent in this sample of museum visitors, the human seemed the most likely to elicit this 
reasoning pattern (Spiegel et al., 2006). Part II analyses address the coherence of the rela-
tionships between themes from the reasoning patterns. Specific hypotheses regarding the 
intercorrelated themes are presented in Part II. 
 
Method: Parts I and II 
 
Participants 
Thirty-two systematically selected museum visitors (38% male, 62% female; 97% non-His-
panic white, 3%multiracial) from three Midwest universities’ natural history museums 
were asked to take part in a 25- to 30-minute audiotaped interview with trained interview-
ers. 
 
Demographics 
At the conclusion of the interview, each visitor completed a demographic form. All the 
results were compiled and averaged across the three sites. Visitors’ age groups were: 18–
24 years (10%), 25–65 years (84%), and 65+ years (6%). Educational levels completed by the 
visitors consisted of: High School (19%); 2-Year College or Vocational School (22%); 4-Year 
College (38%); Graduate School (22%). Overall, the visitors’ education levels were similar 
to those found at other natural history museums and science centers with about 60% hav-
ing completed a 4-year college or higher levels of education (Korn, 1995). Only one partic-
ipant, who taught earth science, had a biology-related profession; the other occupations 
were science or engineering (n = 4), other professional (n = 13), artistic (n = 3), homemakers 
(n = 4), service and retail (n = 5), and retired (n = 2). Fifty-eight percent had a religious 
affiliation (42% did not). The average number of museum visits per year was 5.2 (SD 5.9; 
Range: 0–25). 
 
Procedure and Protocol 
As visitors entered the museum, every other museum visitor was approached (for groups, 
one adult was selected) and given a brief overview of the purpose of the research, and then 
asked to participate in the study (participation rate was 55%). Visitors were told that their 
feedback would be used to provide information about a new exhibition and that they 
would be asked to explain “some new scientific discoveries about a variety of living 
things.” They were not told that these were evolutionary problems, nor was the term evo-
lution used. After visitors agreed to take part they were informed of their rights as study 
participants (as specified by IRB approvals from all three institutions) and specifically 
asked for permission to record the interviews, which were anonymous. At the conclusion 
they were presented with a token gift for their participation. 
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Interview Protocol 
First, visitors were told, “I would like to ask you a few questions about current research on 
how living things have changed over time. I want to know what you think about some 
new scientific discoveries about a variety of living things.” Each visitor was then asked to 
explain the seven evolutionary problems. These problems were based on the core ques-
tions addressed in each of the exhibits. Although each problem could be solved by apply-
ing the same evolutionary principles, each question was worded differently because the 
kind of biological change portrayed differed by organism. None of them mentioned the 
word evolution. The seven questions, accompanied by relevant photographs, were pre-
sented to the museum visitor in the following fixed order: Flies, Finches, Diatom, HIV Vi-
rus, Ant/Fungus, Whale/Hippo, Human/Chimp. For conceptual ease, however, in this 
article the questions and data will be presented in order of size, from the smallest to the 
largest organism (see table 1). From a religious viewpoint, the human/chimp comparison 
was perceived to be the most problematic, so it was presented last to avoid influencing 
visitors’ responses to other questions. If interviewees gave an extremely brief response, or 
said they didn’t know, they were asked: “Can you tell me more” or “Can you take a guess 
at what you think might have happened.” 
In a pilot study, we found that a majority of a representative sample of 60 natural history 
museum visitors interpreted the VIST terms as biological concepts (e.g., defining inher-
itance as the transmission of genes rather than artifacts). This finding indicated that our 
expectation that visitors in the current study might use the VIST framework was realistic. 
In addition, we assessed visitors’ familiarity with and interest in the organisms to be fea-
tured in the current study, which provided background information that was used to in-
terpret the results of the study. 
Visitors’ responses were transcribed and coded into the three main reasoning patterns. 
The overall coding system development is described first, followed by a description of the 
coding systems for each of the reasoning patterns, in turn. For each reasoning pattern, we 
provide a more detailed theoretical rationale before describing the themes. 
 
Coding System 
 
Coding System Development 
The development of the coding scheme was carried out by a team made up of science ed-
ucators and cognitive developmentalists; three with biology backgrounds, and three with 
extensive experience in content analyses of explanations. The team conducted a content 
analysis of the transcriptions of visitors’ responses and identified those units of analysis 
(utterances) that expressed concepts related to the question. These conceptual units ranged 
in size from single words (e.g., the term “evolution”) to several speech fragments that ex-
pressed a particular concept. Based on our theoretical framework, an a priori codebook 
was created and used to carry out a preliminary mapping of the conceptual units onto 
distinct themes (codes), which, in turn, mapped onto the three main reasoning patterns. 
Conceptual units that did not map onto any of the themes were initially coded as other. 
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Further content analyses of the other category revealed additional themes and the code-
book was updated to include these emergent themes. All the themes were operationally 
defined (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
In the final round of coding, two trained coders coded each response. To ensure that 
they were not influenced by a visitor’s overall responses, coders coded all visitors’ re-
sponses to one question but did not view the entire transcript of any one visitor. Initial 
interrater reliability ranged from 86% to 100% for any one question. Subsequently, all re-
sponses were coded to 100% agreement with the entire team’s agreement. The codebook 
was divided into three sections: Informed naturalistic reasoning (table 2), novice natural-
istic reasoning (table 3), and creationist reasoning (table 4). Operational definitions of each 
theme, along with brief examples, are given in these tables and in the text, and the preva-
lence of each theme along with detailed examples of visitors’ explanations are given in the 
Results section. 
 
Informed Naturalistic Reasoning (INR) 
 
Conceptual Framework 
One crucial issue was whether visitors would spontaneously realize that these were evo-
lutionary problems. Their mention of an evolutionary term was one sign of this realization 
and this was coded as an informed naturalistic reasoning theme (see table 2). Ideally, evolu-
tionary reasoners should be able to reason about the biological mechanism underlying a 
biological phenomenon How does it work? and link it to the more distal or evolutionary 
cause: Why does it work that way? (Mayr, 1982, pp. 67–68). Citing only a proximate biological 
mechanism does not address the evolutionary cause. Given previous research, it seemed 
unlikely that even the more expert visitors would access a fully developed evolutionary 
framework. On the other hand, an informed naturalistic reasoner might well exhibit some 
understanding of the VIST concepts and the related concept of common descent. Common 
descent was coded separately from selection and time because earlier research indicated 
that while children and adults (or pre-Darwinian evolutionists) might accept the idea of 
descent with modification, this does not mean that they understand the Darwinian mech-
anism of natural selection (Evans, 2001, 2008). The nomothetic approach prevailed in the 
coding of the informed reasoning pattern, with textbooks on evolution (e.g., Futuyma, 
1998) providing the scientific model. Some modification of the major themes occurred dur-
ing coding development. 
 
Table 2. Informed naturalistic reasoning pattern: themes, definitions, and examples 
Theme Operational Definition Examples 
Evolution term Mention of main evolution term “Evolution,” “Darwin(ian),” 
“Survival of the fittest” 
Variation Differences among individuals in 
a population 
“There were finches with larger 
beaks and some with smaller 
beaks” 
Inheritance Traits (genes) are inherited and 
passed on to the next generation 
“The big-beaked finches had ba-
bies that looked the same” 
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Common descent Reference to a common ancestor 
or a descendent (implication that 
these were different “species”) 
“They could have been derived 
from the same early ancestor” 
(Natural) Selection Organisms with adaptive traits 
are more likely to survive 
“The large-beaked finches were 
better able to eat the large seeds 
and they survived” 
Time Implication that there had to be 
enough time for natural selection 
to occur 
“I supposed they just changed 
over time” 
Chance Any reference to happenstance, 
chance, or accident 
“. . . then this relationship acci-
dentally happened” 
Sexual selection Any reference to sexual selection No examples 
Ecological pressure Mention of ecological pressures 
as a causal agent in diversification 
or change 
“. . . adapt to the different ecologi-
cal niches on the islands” 
 
Codebook 
Responses coded under the informed naturalistic reasoning pattern expressed a rudimen-
tary understanding of evolution by invoking a Darwinian evolutionary term, one of the 
evolutionary subconcepts—variation, inheritance, selection, time—from the VIST framework 
or a related concept (see table 2). The VIST definitions that informed our coding were as 
follows: Variation referred to differences among individuals in a population, such as dif-
ferences in traits (features, behaviors), a mutation, or genes. Inheritance referred to traits 
that are passed from one generation to the next. Selection referred to the idea that organisms 
with traits that are adaptive (in one environment) are more likely to survive (and pass these 
factors on to the next generation). Time referred to the idea that the number of generations 
produced over a given time period determines whether evolution change will occur rap-
idly (HIV) or slowly (whales). 
To distinguish those responses that included evolutionary terms (e.g., “evolution”) 
from those responses that referenced evolutionary concepts a separate code for the terms 
(evolution term) was created. Although we did not specifically code for an expert under-
standing of evolutionary theory, any visitor that consistently provided the VIST subcon-
cepts for each problem would be considered an expert. The evolutionary subconcept 
variation was coded as a theme only if there was a reference to within-species variation. 
References to differential survival, coded as selection, and differential inheritance, coded as 
inheritance, were coded separately, as the content analysis indicated that visitors often ref-
erenced only one these concepts (both are required for a full understanding of natural se-
lection). In the following example, variation and selection each appeared as two sentence 
fragments (1–2): 
 
FINCH EXAMPLE (INR) Visitor’s Response:  . . . the finches with the larger beaks 
survived [selection-1], I suppose—the ones who didn’t have large beaks [varia-
tion-1] died out [selection-2]—and so they kept propagating and the beaks got 
larger and larger, which is good for them because they were able to get the tough 
seeds, and the ones with the small beaks lost out [variation-2]. . . 
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References to a common ancestor or descendent were coded as common descent, if it was 
clear that these were different species. Any mention of the significance of time for biologi-
cal change over generations, was coded as time. Sexual selection was included as an a priori 
code, as it is the evolutionary mechanism that explains fruit-fly speciation. Random events 
or chance and ecological pressure also emerged as themes in visitors’ responses. 
 
Novice Naturalistic and Creationist Reasoning Patterns 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Although a more idiographic approach (Wandersee et al., 1994) prevailed in the coding of 
the novice naturalistic and creationist reasoning patterns, coding was guided by a concep-
tual framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994), but we were also sensitive to the emergence of 
previously unreported themes. First we describe the conceptual framework, and later we 
describe the themes in detail. For the novice naturalistic reasoning pattern, coding focused on 
the goal-directed and intentional explanatory concepts found in prior research, particu-
larly in research with children. We argued earlier that there are important differences be-
tween these two conceptual systems; moreover, these differences become even more 
critical when we consider the creationist reasoning pattern. Coding of the latter included ref-
erences to supernatural causes, ranging from explicit statements about God’s creative pow-
ers to more implicit references to belief. However, as goal-directed and intentional concepts 
are also essential to the expression of creationist ideas, we review some theoretical distinc-
tions between the two. Finally, we provide evidence for the early emergence of these ideas 
in young children. 
Goal-directed reasoning is one of a family of teleological concepts that imply purpose, 
a progression toward an endpoint or goal (see Mayr, 1982, pp. 47–51). Psychologically, 
there is a key distinction to be made between internal/intrinsic and external/extrinsic tele-
ological processes (for a philosophical equivalent, see Kampourakis & Zogza, 2007, p. 395). 
Properties of living kinds serve the intrinsic purpose, or needs, of the organism itself, 
whereas properties of artifacts serve the extrinsic purpose of a designer (Keil, 1994). The 
shape of the butterfly’s wings, for example, helps the butterfly fly, whereas the shape of a 
cup makes it easier for humans to drink liquids—the shape confers no benefit on the cup 
itself, it just benefits the human designer. 
A belief in God’s creation of the natural world can be derived, analogically, from this 
kind of artificialist reasoning (Evans, 2000, 2001, 2008; Kelemen, 2004; Piaget, 1929): To the 
extent that a living kind is thought to be designed, then it is treated as if it were an artifact. 
Such explanations are embedded in a folk theory of intentionality. For it to become a crea-
tionist argument, it is necessary to incorporate a belief in a supernatural designer—God. 
This example is illustrative of a synthetic model, in which ideas derived from an intuitive 
psychology are fused with culturally available ideas about a supernatural being, a central 
planner. This fusion both reinforces and amplifies the impact of creationist beliefs (Evans, 
2001). Accordingly, references to the purposes or desires of a supernatural designer were 
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coded under the creationist reasoning pattern. Whereas, naturalistic references to the in-
trinsic needs or desires of the organism itself were coded under the novice naturalistic 
reasoning pattern. 
 
What Do Children Say? 
Given the core question regarding the prevalence in adult reasoning of intuitive concepts 
found earlier in life, it is important to know what children say. When asked about the ori-
gins of “the very first Xs” (where X is an animal or a human), 5- to 7-year-olds from Chris-
tian fundamentalist communities simply stated that “God made it.” Their 
nonfundamentalist counterparts often cited God, but they also stated that the animal “just 
appeared,” or “came out of the ground” (Evans, 2000). It appears that children in this age 
group do not necessarily grasp that the organisms were previously nonexistent; they ex-
plain where the animal came from, the proximate cause, rather than how it came into exist-
ence, the more distal or ultimate cause (Evans, 2000; Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, & 
Anzelmo, 2001). In response to the same question, most 8- to 9-year-olds, regardless of 
community background, give creationist responses. By early adolescence, children’s re-
sponses to this question reflected the beliefs of their community of origin. The “evolution-
ist” explanations of children from nonfundamentalist communities, however, were pre-
Darwinian, referencing the intrinsic need of the organism to adapt. In addition to the effect 
of parent beliefs, unique variance in children’s evolutionist ideas was explained by chil-
dren’s exposure to evidence that animals change, from fossils, to adaptive change, to met-
amorphosis (Evans, 2000, 2001, 2008). While this evidence of biological change appeared 
to challenge children’s intuitive essentialist ideas that animal kinds are fixed in time and 
place, it also had the effect of reinforcing children’s intuitions about intrinsic needs. In con-
trast, Christian fundamentalist children’s intuitive essentialist ideas were reinforced by 
their community belief system: “it can’t change, because God made it that way” (Evans, 
2001). This interaction between community beliefs and children’s intuitive concepts yields 
novel synthetic blends, reflecting the fusion of intuitive and cultural conceptions (Evans et 
al., in press). 
Given this analysis, in our coding scheme if visitors explained biological change as sat-
isfying the needs of the organism, this was coded as a goal-directed novice naturalistic 
theme. References to mental state explanations, such as thoughts and desires (e.g., “the ant 
tried to find the fungus”), that align with the conscious intentions of the organism, were 
coded as an intentional, novice naturalistic theme. On the other hand, if visitors referenced 
God’s purpose, this was coded as a supernatural theme, which is intentional and teleological 
but not naturalistic. 
 
Codebook: Novice Naturalistic Reasoning (NNR) 
Responses coded as NNR used intuitive naturalistic modes of reasoning to explain the 
problems (see table 3). Goal-directed explanations that referenced the intrinsic needs or 
goals of the organisms were coded separately from intentional explanations that referenced 
mental states, skills, or a conscious effort to change. Both of these explanations referenced 
individual change, not population change. Distinct forms of goal-directed reasoning 
emerged in the coding process (Evans, 2005). In one theme, there was a clear analogy to 
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developmental change or growth toward an end-point; in the other theme, the organism 
changed its body or behavior in order to adjust to a novel environment (need-based adapta-
tion). Another emergent theme, also found in children (Evans, 2000), was a simpler mode, 
in which the visitor merely noted the adaptive relationship between the organism and the 
environment but did not mention environmental change (static adaptation). 
 
Table 3. Novice naturalistic reasoning pattern: themes, definitions, and examples 
Theme Operational Definition Examples 
Intentional Use of mental states, skills, or 
conscious effort to explain change 
“. . . had to try and work harder, 
probably, to develop their beaks” 
Essentialist Category-based induction (refer-
encing species stability) 
“Humans and chimps are the 
same kind” 
Static adaptation References the organism- 
environment fit as the reason a 
particular organism might be 
found in a particular location 
“Well, this area is generally 
colder and you find this type of 
algae in this type of location” 
Adaptive feature list Simply lists adaptive features of 
one or more organisms 
“. . . toes and webbed feet for the 
land, instead of fins, most whales 
have fins . . .” 
Goal-directed “need-based adap-
tation” 
The organism changes to meet a 
need or purpose, a functional or 
adaptive goal-directed behavior 
“The first fungus needed to be 
protected from the second fungus 
so it developed a natural defense 
mechanism in the ant to stave it 
off” 
Goal-directed “develops” The organism develops toward 
an inbuilt goal [no mention of 
need] 
“As they grow they develop into 
other types of HIV” 
Proximate cause—agent An agent brought the organism in 
from some place else 
“Obviously, people brought the 
fruit flies in . . .” 
Proximate cause—other The organism was always there, 
but was not detected 
“The new strains of HIV were 
there, scientists hadn’t seen 
them” 
Reproduction Reference to reproduction or an 
increase in numbers, no clear ref-
erence to inherited features 
“Then they multiplied when they 
got to Hawaii” 
Hybridization Two unrelated animals interbred “Then the different kinds of flies 
bred and they had different off-
spring” 
 
An emergent theme, proximate cause, defined simply as a cause that immediately pre-
cedes the effect, was also evident in visitors’ transcripts. For example, accidental or inten-
tional transmission by an animate agent was invoked to explain variation in the fly 
population (e.g., “people brought the flies”). In effect, these visitors did not address the 
“origins” question, in that they failed to recognize that an evolutionary cause was required; 
they responded as if the organism was always here. If the visitor denied that any change 
occurred, this was coded as proximate cause–other. This type of response has been noted in 
children, as described earlier (Evans, 2000, 2008; Southerland et al., 2001). As neither of 
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these proximate causes addressed Mayr’s (1982, pp. 67–68) concerns with proximate bio-
logical mechanisms that relate to the “functions of an organism and its parts,” they were 
coded as novice themes. 
Several other emergent novice themes included references to the stability of species (es-
sentialist), their reproductive capacity (reproduction), and hybridization. One very common 
response included repeated references to the adaptive features of organisms (rather than 
the whole organism), which was simply coded as an adaptive features list. 
 
Codebook: Creationist Reasoning Pattern (CR) 
Responses invoking a supernatural rather than a naturalistic cause, citing God or the cre-
ative process were coded as creationist reasoning (see table 4). As described earlier, this 
was an intentional and teleological mode of construal in which natural kinds were inten-
tionally created to serve an extrinsic purpose: God’s purpose. They were, in effect, treated 
as artifacts created by God. Typically, creationists who are Biblical literalists reject common 
descent and argue that God created each organism a few thousand years ago with a specific 
essence (essentialism) that is eternal and unchanging, or they reference intelligent design 
(Evans, 2001, 2008). In addition to these themes, several more emerged during coding de-
velopment. Overall we attempted to differentiate between themes expressed by sophisti-
cated creationists who explicitly rejected evolutionary principles, and those expressed 
more by more intuitive creationists who vaguely referenced their beliefs (see table 4 for 
details). 
 
Table 4. Creationist reasoning pattern: themes, definitions, examples 
Theme Operational Definition Examples 
God’s creation God created each organism “. . . God was the creator and he 
designed and created every or-
ganism” 
God’s variation God created the diversity seen in 
organisms 
“God created the algae with the 
DNA to expand into different 
kinds” 
God’s adaptation God made organisms so that they 
are adapted to fit in with their en-
vironment 
“He created this almost symbiotic 
relationship between the ant and 
the fungus” 
God’s essence God created each organism with a 
specific “essence” and it does not 
change 
“I think they were created as they 
are with their own unique set of 
chromosomes” 
Young earth creationists Specifically rejects geological time 
and the age of the earth 
“I don’t think the world is more 
than 1,000 years old” 
Rejects common descent Rejects the idea of common ances-
try or common descent 
“Well, I wouldn’t believe the an-
cestor theory” 
Intelligent design Refers to the design of organisms 
by a sentient entity, but no refer-
ence to God 
No examples 
Vague belief Declaration of religious or biblical 
belief—not explicit 
“I believe in a catastrophic flood” 
“I’m religious” “I am a Christian” 
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Scoring 
In sum, each of the three reasoning pattern was made up of distinct themes, with the num-
ber of themes differing by pattern. Each visitor’s response to a question about each of the 
seven organisms (32 × 7 = 224 responses) might reference a theme from one or more of the 
three reasoning patterns. For every response, each theme was coded as either present (1) 
or absent (0). Therefore, even if a visitor repeated the same theme in his or her response to 
the question on any one organism, it was coded as present once, only. Thus, for each visi-
tor’s response to each question, the potential range for a single theme was 0–1. However, 
one visitor could report the same theme (e.g., variation) seven times, once for each ques-
tion/organism. If a visitor responded “Don’t Know” this response was coded as zero for 
all themes for that particular question. Across all participants (and organisms), 601 non-
repeating conceptual units were identified that mapped onto distinct themes; in addition, 
31 conceptual units were coded as “other.” The coding scheme successfully captured most 
(95%) of the conceptual content of the visitors’ responses. In addition, four participants 
responded “don’t know” to one of the questions and two more responded similarly to two 
of the other questions, resulting in eight “don’t knows” (see table 5). For any one ques-
tion/organism, the number of themes that any one visitor might potentially mention for 
the informed naturalistic reasoning pattern (INR) could range from 0 to 9, for the novice 
naturalistic reasoning pattern (NNR) the potential range was 0–10, and for the creationist 
reasoning pattern (INR) the potential range was 0–8 (see tables 2–4). 
 
Table 5. Response patterns for the seven organisms: percentage of participants endorsing a 
particular pattern 
Organism 
INR 
Only 
(%) 
NNR 
Only 
(%) 
CR 
Only 
(%) 
INR 
NNR 
(%) 
INR 
NNR CR 
(%) 
INR 
CR 
(%) 
NNR 
CR 
(%) 
Don’t 
Know 
(%) 
Virus 16 34 0 44 0 0 0 6 
Diatom 19 38 0 28 3 0 3 9 
Ant 9 34 3 44 0 6 0 3 
Fly 9 47 6 38 0 0 0 0 
Finch 19 13 0 66 0 3 0 0 
Whale 22 19 0 47 0 6 0 6 
Human 25 6 3 41 9 9 6 0 
Average 17 27 2 44 2 3 1 3 
INR, informed naturalistic reasoning; NNR, novice naturalistic reasoning; CR, creationist reasoning. 
 
Results: Part I, What Is the Nature of Visitors’ Reasoning Patterns? 
 
The overall reasoning patterns are described first, followed by the most frequent themes 
that visitors use for each reasoning pattern, along with examples. 
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Overall Reasoning Patterns 
 
Overall 
None of the visitors employed any of the three main reasoning patterns exclusively across 
all seven questions/organisms. Mixed reasoning patterns predominated for individuals 
and for questions, as predicted (see fig. 1), with visitors using one pattern for one question 
and another for a different question, or even using a mixed pattern for a single question. 
Overall, the most common pattern for individual museum visitors was informed natural-
istic/novice naturalistic reasoning (72%). A less common pattern was informed natural-
istic/novice naturalistic/creationist reasoning (28%). While all of the visitors used mixed 
patterns of reasoning, most of them exhibited a dominant reasoning mode, which they 
used most frequently. Using this metric, 34% could be classified as consistent informed 
naturalistic reasoners, 53% as consistent novice naturalistic reasoners, and 6% as creation-
ist reasoners (6% were equally novice and informed naturalistic reasoners). 
 
Reasoning Patterns by Organism 
Even if visitors changed their reasoning pattern from one question to the next, they could 
still apply one pattern exclusively to each question/organism. In table 5, the percentage of 
participants using a particular pattern for each organism is shown. The predominant pro-
file is still a mixed novice/informed naturalistic reasoning pattern with 44% of participants 
using it on average, ranging from 28% for the diatom to 66% for the finch. Yet, as seen in 
this table, participants often employed a single reasoning pattern for a particular organism. 
Again, novice naturalistic reasoning predominates, with 27% of participants, on average, 
using this reasoning pattern exclusively, ranging from 6% for the human to 47% for the fly. 
The virus, diatom, ant, and fly were the most likely to elicit this pattern. The informed 
naturalistic reasoning pattern was used exclusively by 17% of the participants, on average, 
across the seven questions. The human (25%) was the most likely to elicit this pattern and 
the ant (9%) and fly (9%) least likely to do so. Creationist reasoning was most often used 
for the human, usually in combination with the other patterns. 
Another way of presenting this information, which maintains the focus on each organ-
ism, is to ask what percent of the participants endorse at least one theme from each of the 
three reasoning patterns, for each organism. The results are averaged across the 32 visitors 
for each organism and presented in a single figure, with the organisms arranged from the 
smallest to the largest. As can be seen in figure 2, the finch, human, and whale are most 
likely to elicit a theme from the informed naturalistic pattern (INR), while the other organ-
isms are more likely to elicit novice naturalistic themes (NNR); the human is most likely to 
elicit a creationist theme (CR). 
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Figure 2. The percentage of participants endorsing at least one theme from each of the 
three reasoning patterns, for each organism. 
 
This finding suggests a divide between single-celled/invertebrate and vertebrate ani-
mals. Taking into account the results from the pilot study, it appears that, regardless of 
familiarity or interest, invertebrate organisms elicit novice naturalistic reasoning and ver-
tebrates more informed reasoning. In the pilot study, visitors’ interest and biological 
knowledge cut across these groupings. The fly and the finch were the first two questions 
presented, therefore there does not appear to be an effect of presentation order. The word-
ing of the questions differed from one organism to another, but not in a way that would 
clearly predict these findings. Additionally, as predicted, the human was most likely to 
elicit creationist reasoning. 
 
Themes and Reasoning Patterns 
So far our results have demonstrated that mixed reasoning patterns prevail. In this section, 
the focus is on a description of the themes most likely to be endorsed for each reasoning 
pattern. A list of the themes endorsed by 20% or more of the sample for the informed and 
novice naturalistic reasoning patterns can be seen in table 6. Given the comparative rarity 
of creationist responses, all creationist themes mentioned by 6% of the sample, or more, 
were included in the table. Summing across all seven organisms, the mean and standard 
deviation for the number of themes (recall that each theme was coded as present or absent 
for each question/organism) mentioned by each visitor, for each reasoning pattern was: 
INR (M = 9.4, SD = 6.1, Range 2–25), NNR (M = 8.1, SD = 4.3, Range 1–19), and CR (M = 1.3, 
SD = 3.5, Range 0–16). For ease of presentation, under the novice naturalistic reasoner pat-
tern, two similar themes, need-based adaptation and development, were combined under 
a “goal-directed” theme and the two proximate cause themes (agent and other) were also 
combined (see table 6). 
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Table 6. For each organism, the main themes for the naturalistic and informed reasoning 
patterns (endorsed by 20% or more of participants), and for the creationist reasoning pattern 
(endorsed by 6% or more of participants) 
Organism 
Informed Naturalistic 
Reasoning 
Novice Naturalistic 
Reasoning 
Creationist 
Reasoning 
Virus Variation (38%) 
Ecological press. (22%) 
Proximate cause (34%) 
Goal directed (22%) 
Reproduction (22%) 
None 
Diatom Ecological press. (31%) 
Evolution term (22%) 
Static adaptation (53%) 
Proximate cause (31%) 
Vague belief (6%) 
Ant Evolution term (28%) 
Selection (22%) 
Static adaptation (53%) 
Goal directed (41%) 
God’s creation (6%) 
God’s adaptation (6%) 
Fly Evolution term (25%) 
Variation (25%) 
Time (22%) 
Proximate cause (50%) 
Reproduction (34%) 
Hybridization (22%) 
Young earthers (6%) 
Vague belief (6%) 
Finch Ecological press. (62%) 
Evolution term (50%) 
Selection (44%) 
Variation (25%) 
Goal directed (53%) 
Reproduction (22%) 
 
Human Evolution term (56%) 
Common descent (38%) 
Time (28%) 
Ecological press. (25%) 
Adaptive features (44%) 
Goal directed (22%) 
Rejects descent (22%) 
Vague belief (16%) 
God’s creation (9%) 
God’s essence (6%) 
Young earthers (6%) 
Whale Ecological press. (47%) 
Evolution term (47%) 
Common descent (25%) 
Time (25%) 
Static adaptation (34%) 
Adaptive features (34%) 
Goal directed (28%) 
 
 
Informed Naturalistic Reasoning (INR) Pattern (Table 2) 
The most frequent themes from the informed naturalistic reasoning pattern, summed 
across all organisms and averaged across visitors, were: evolution terms (M = 2.3, SD = 2.0, 
Range 0–7), and the concepts of ecological pressure (M = 2.0, SD = 1.5, Range 0–6), variation 
(M = 1.4, SD = 1.6, Range 0–5), time (M = 1.3, SD = 1.5, Range 0–5), selection (M = 1.0, SD = 
1.4, Range 0–5), and common descent (M = 0.8, SD = 0.8, Range 0–2) (see table 2). Sexual 
selection was never mentioned; inheritance and chance were mentioned by fewer than 
20%. 
 
Evolution Terms 
Evolution terms were the most frequently mentioned INR theme. In figure 3 the percent-
age of visitors endorsing at least one evolution term for each organism is presented. The 
most frequent evolution terms were: evolution, Darwin(ian), and survival of the fittest (alt-
hough the latter is technically incorrect, for the purposes of this study we included it). 
Typically visitors did not mention VIST terms though they did describe them conceptually. 
Between 47% and 56% of the museum visitors used an evolution term to explain the finch, 
human, and whale biological change problems. For the other organisms, visitors invoked 
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such terms less often (6–28%). Presentation order was unlikely to have influenced this pat-
tern, as the human and whale were presented last and the finch second. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants using evolutionary terms for each organism (+SEM). 
 
Variation and Selection 
In terms of the VIST concepts, the most commonly invoked were: variation, time, and se-
lection. Fewer than 40% of the sample invoked the concept of within-species variation (see 
table 2). It was most likely to be associated with the virus (38%), the fly (25%), and the finch 
(25%) (table 6). A more stringent test of evolutionary reasoning is the application of a nat-
ural selection theme. In figure 4 the percentage of participants who mentioned a selection 
theme for each organism is presented (see also table 6). The finch (44%) was the only or-
ganism that elicited a significant number of selection responses. None of the visitors ap-
plied a selection theme to the virus and, with the exception of the ant (22%), fewer than 
20% applied it to the other organisms. The information provided in the finch question 
probably helped elicit such responses but only for those participants who were ready to 
recognize the selectionist contingencies. See the following example: 
 
FINCH: Well, in that case I would assume that the birds evolved [Evolutionary 
Term]—well, the birds with the larger beaks [Variation] were the ones better able 
to survive, since the larger beaks were more useful in getting the seeds. So that 
trait is the one that was selected for, and the birds that had the smaller beaks died 
out [Selection], I would assume. 
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Figure 4. Percentage of participants using a selection theme for each organism (+SEM). 
 
Time 
Specific information about time was incorporated into all of the problems to some degree. 
Fewer than 30% of the visitors, however, regularly invoked time in their responses to the 
problems (see table 6). The fly (22%), whale (25%), and the human (28%) problems elicited 
time responses in more than 20% of the sample. The consistent creationists (Young 
Earthers—see table 4) routinely denied the possibility of geological time. In the case of the 
finch there was an interesting negative reference to time; a few participants did not think 
that there had been enough time for “evolution” to occur, as in the following example: 
 
FINCH: Well, you wouldn’t expect to see evolution occurring so rapidly . . . 
 
Common Descent 
The whale and the human/chimp problems were the only ones that explicitly incorporated 
information about common ancestors into the question. Even so, visitors were either reluc-
tant or unable to use that information to explain the problem: Whale (25%), human/chimp 
(38%) (see table 6). Additionally, some visitors who did address common descent for the 
human/chimp problem were genuinely puzzled as to how the “chimps” could still be here. 
In this common misunderstanding, visitors failed to realize that apes and humans have a 
common ancestor that is neither chimp nor human, as follows: 
 
HUMAN/CHIMP:  . . . I just got done saying that everything else can evolve over 
time to fit the environment, but if we evolved over time from the chimp, I guess 
my big question is why is the chimp still here in his original form. Like on the 
other ones, they evolved and their earlier format disappeared. The chimp hasn’t 
disappeared, he has continued to survive as he is. So, I don’t know how I would 
explain that we evolved from them . . . 
 
Ecological Pressure 
Based on earlier research, we had hypothesized that the realization that changed environ-
ments exert significant pressure on organisms is an important insight, which is not neces-
sarily accompanied by an understanding of natural selection, per se. In the development 
E V A N S  E T  A L . ,  J O U R N A L  O F  R E S E A R C H  I N  S C I E N C E  T E A C H I N G  4 7 :3  (2 0 1 0 )  
23 
of the coding system we had observed three kinds of themes that addressed the environ-
ment, one of which, ecological pressures, we coded as informed naturalistic reasoning. In 
this case, participants might note differences in habitats and their effects on organisms 
(Flies: “the fact that there’s lots of different fruit”; Finches: “they adapted fairly quickly to 
the change in food”). The theme, ecological pressure, was elicited by most of the organisms 
(see table 6): finches (62%), whale (47%), diatom (31%), human (25%), and virus (22%). 
 
Novice Naturalistic Reasoning (NNR) Pattern (Table 3) 
As described earlier, the virus, diatom, ant, and fly were more likely to invoke an NNR 
pattern (see fig. 2). The most frequent themes from the novice naturalistic reasoning pat-
tern, summed across all organisms and averaged across visitors, were (see tables 3 and 6): 
static adaptation (M = 1.7, SD = 1.1, Range 0–4), need-based adaptation (M = 1.6, SD = 1.6, 
Range 0–6), proximate cause agent/other (M = 1.5, SD = 1.2, Range 0–5), adaptive feature 
list (M = 1.0, SD = 1.1, Range 0–4), and reproduction (M = 1.0, SD = 1.0, Range 0–3). The first 
three themes are also prevalent in children’s reasoning patterns (Evans, 2001, 2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of participants using goal-directed themes for each organism 
(+SEM). 
 
Goal-Directed Responses 
The classic misconstrual of Darwinian evolution is the adaptationist response in which the 
individual organism adapts itself to environmental conditions, which we have called need-
based adaptation. For ease of presentation, we combined responses for this more prevalent 
theme with the less prevalent development theme (see table 3) and called them goal- 
directed responses, as they both imply progression toward a goal. In figure 5, the percent-
age of participants endorsing a goal-directed theme at least once for each organism is pre-
sented. The two organisms most likely to elicit this response were the finch (53%) and the 
ant (41%). Typically these responses referenced an endogenous process in which new fea-
tures just emerge, grow, or develop when the need arises: 
 
FINCH: Evolution for survival. . . . Well, in order to survive, their body parts had 
to adjust to certain things, similar to the way giraffes’ necks probably grew long 
as they reached for the plants at the top of the trees, so the beak grew longer in 
order to deal with the tougher seeds. 
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ANT: The first fungus needed to be protected from the second fungus, so it de-
veloped a natural defense mechanism in the ant in order to stave it off. 
 
Proximate Cause 
Two kinds of proximate cause themes were identified: agent and other. In figure 6 the percent-
age of participants endorsing either type of proximate cause at least once for each organism 
is presented (see also table 6). Fifty percent of the visitors applied this theme to the fruit fly 
and just over 30% applied it to the virus and diatom. For the virus, visitors tended to deny 
that the scientists were correct in their assessment that the organism did not exist: “They 
were there but they weren’t detected” (proximate cause–other). The assumption that the 
organism was always present (but some place where it could not be seen) is illustrated in 
the following example. The visitor responds as if the organism always existed, but just had 
to be transported from someplace else (proximate cause-agent), a pattern also seen in 
younger populations (Evans, 2000, 2001). 
 
FRUIT FLIES: Obviously people have brought the fruit flies in. And Dole proba-
bly, Dole pineapple people probably brought them in. 
 
Reproduction 
These themes were elicited mostly by the fly (34%), finch (22%), and virus (22%). They 
could easily be distinguished from inheritance. For reproduction, visitors merely refer-
enced the multiplication of the species but did not refer to the passing on of traits from one 
generation to the next, as in the following example (which also included hybridization). 
 
FRUIT FLIES: However they came here I don’t know, but they just started mat-
ing and then they cross mated as far as animals do, I’m guessing. 
 
Ecological Responses: Static Adaptation and Adaptive Features List 
The two environmental responses that were coded under the NNR pattern were static ad-
aptation and adaptive features list (see table 3). For static adaptation, visitors typically just 
referenced the environment-organism fit without noting changes in environmental condi-
tions. This was most often applied to the diatom (53%: “this type of algae grows better in 
colder climates”), the ant (53%), and the whale (34%). In the case of adaptive features list, 
visitors merely listed adaptive features of organisms. This was most often found for the 
whale (34%) and the human (44%). 
 
WHALE: The webbed feet, it once was a land, maybe, um . . . toes and webbed feet 
instead of fins, most whales have fins, dorsal fins, so if he was once a land animal. 
But the hippo is hoofed, so it must have something to do with, maybe the verte-
brae . . . 
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Figure 6. Percentage of participants using proximate causes for each organism (+SEM). 
 
Creationist Reasoning Patterns (Table 4) 
A creationist theme was mentioned by 28% of the visitors. In figure 2 the percentage of 
participants endorsing a creationist reasoning theme at least once for each organism is pre-
sented. The virus never invoked a creationist response, whereas the chimp/human was the 
most likely to do so (see table 6). When confronted with a possible relationship between 
the chimp and the human, many participants expressed a range of responses from outright 
rejection of common descent (22%) to a vague doubt (16%), as in the following example of 
mixed reasoning: 
 
HUMAN/CHIMP: I don’t believe that they do, because I don’t believe neces-
sarily in evolution. I mean yes, I believe there’s a Darwinism where the stronger 
species survived, but, I’m Christian so I believe God created man and God cre-
ated chimpanzees [CR/INR] 
 
Interestingly, one of the more consistent creationist reasoners shifted between a crea-
tionist and selectionist response for the finch, as in the following example: 
 
FINCH: That’s a good question. I probably can’t explain that. But like I said, be-
cause of my biblical world view, I don’t believe in evolution. So I don’t believe 
that they evolved because it takes too long. There are too many failures before 
they evolve into something that finally works, so I just reject that view. Um, my 
guess would be that there probably were larger beaked finches but there weren’t 
as many of them and the small beaked ones would have died out because they 
couldn’t get the food. But I don’t think that it went the other way—that there 
were no large beaks and so they grew into large beaks. So is that clear enough? 
[CR/INR] 
 
The following creationist reasoner acknowledged variation in a population, but as-
cribed it to God’s intervention: God built it into the DNA. 
 
FRUIT FLY: Um, first of all I have a problem with your 8 million years. I believe 
in creation in the biblical account, so that pretty well defines how I believe things. 
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God created them and due to the great flood, that is how the diversity came and 
that would be my explanation. . . . OK, I believe um, God created a pair, a male 
and female of everything with the ability to diversify. So I guess what I meant at 
the time of the flood, I believe that’s when the continents broke apart and so even 
though only a few of each things were saved in the flood, they had the genetic 
background to be able to diversify into all of the, like for instance, dogs, and all 
the different kinds that we have. And so um, does that help? Just a creationistic 
view. 
 
Results: Part II, Are Visitors’ Frameworks Coherent? 
 
First, the second overall research question, which was whether visitors’ endorsement of 
mixed reasoning patterns was coherent (see Vosniadou et al., 2008) or fragmented (see 
diSessa, 2008) is addressed. Next, given that mixed reasoning patterns prevailed in visitors’ 
responses, these analyses also allowed us to examine whether certain themes might repre-
sent a transition or bridge between reasoning patterns; that is, whether there were signifi-
cant correlations, either negative or positive, between particular themes from two different 
reasoning patterns. 
To assess whether visitors’ responses were coherent, hypotheses regarding the relation-
ship between the major reasoning patterns and particular themes were evaluated using 
zero-order correlations. Only themes that were conceptually central to each of the main 
patterns and were endorsed by 20% or more of the sample are presented in table 7. This 
evaluation was achieved by assessing the relationship between the overall patterns (meas-
ured as the percent of total themes committed to each pattern), and the main themes (meas-
ured as the number of times each theme was endorsed across questions, with a possible 
range of 0–7 per participant). 
Following a brief discussion of the relationship between the reasoning patterns and the 
demographic variables, we then discuss each of the three major reasoning patterns in turn. 
Conceptually central themes were those hypothesized to be key indicators of a particular 
reasoning pattern. In part, these were identified on the basis of previous research. The 
overall pattern of intercorrelations, excluding the demographic variables, is presented in 
table 7. 
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For informed naturalistic reasoning, the focus was on the VIST concepts, particularly 
variation and common descent, because endorsement of these themes indicated that intu-
itive essentialist constraints that animal kinds cannot change had been modified. Likewise 
an endorsement of selection suggested that visitors were no longer endorsing intuitive 
goal-directed reasoning, which could be verified by assessing the relations between those 
two variables. For the novice naturalistic reasoning pattern, the focal question, as described 
earlier, was whether goal-directed reasoning was the most diagnostic of that pattern. 
Given the emergent themes in Part I, of additional interest was the extent to which visitors 
were sensitive to environmental issues, which are key to grasping evolutionary change; 
these included ecological pressures, for the informed reasoning pattern, and adaptation 
for the novice pattern. Analyses of the latter variables were exploratory; similarly, explor-
atory analyses of conceptually interesting variables, even if endorsed by less than 20% of 
the sample, were included. 
 
Demographic Variables 
Older participants tended to be more highly educated (r = 0.41, p = 0.03). Additionally, the 
number of museum visits made by the visitors was positively related to their use of evo-
lutionary terms (r = 0.36, p < 0.05). There were no other significant relationships. 
 
Informed Naturalistic Reasoning (INR) Pattern 
Given that the VIST concepts are core evolutionary concepts (Futuyma, 1998), it was pre-
dicted that they would be central to the informed naturalistic reasoning pattern and that 
they would be positively correlated with the overall INR pattern and negatively correlated 
with the novice (NNR) reasoning pattern. (The pattern of intercorrelations between the 
most prevalent INR themes—variables 1–6—and the overall reasoning patterns—variables 
11–13—can be found in table 7). As described earlier, creationist reasoners may endorse 
selection, an INR concept, providing they construe it as within-species change, but reject 
common descent, another INR concept, because they view God as the exclusive creator of 
new forms of life (Jones, 2005). If these hypotheses hold, then the overall INR and CR pat-
terns would be uncorrelated. 
Evolution terms (Var. 1), variation (Var. 2), and selection (Var. 4) were significantly pos-
itively correlated with the overall informed (INR) pattern, negatively correlated with the 
novice (NNR) pattern, and uncorrelated with the creationist (CR) pattern (table 7). These 
seemed to be diagnostic concepts for distinguishing between informed and novice reason-
ing. On the other hand, common descent (Var. 3) and ecological pressures (Var. 6) were 
negatively correlated (p < 0.06) with the CR pattern, but were not clearly diagnostic of the 
informed reasoning pattern. Notably, selection and common descent were uncorrelated. 
Based on earlier descriptions of creationist reasoning patterns, this pattern was predict-
able because, as described, some creationist reasoners endorse selection (God created the 
potential for diversity in DNA) but reject common descent, which, for them, is the defini-
tion of evolution (Jones, 2005). Also, creationist reasoners’ mention of evolutionary terms 
was usually done in a negative fashion; it did indicate, however, their recognition that the 
problems required more than a proximate cause explanation, even while they provided 
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God as the final cause. The time concept (Var. 5) was significantly related to informed nat-
uralistic reasoning but uncorrelated with the other patterns. Some participants mentioned 
time along with common descent, which is reflected in the significant positive relationship 
between these variables. Yet, although other participants seemed to recognize the im-
portance of the time concept, they were unable to frame it in evolutionary terms. Variation 
and time were also significantly related. 
The significant positive relationship between selection, variation, and time (table 7), and 
selection and inheritance (r = 0.36; p < 0.05) indicates that participants often accessed the 
full VIST framework, in a coherent manner, even if they did not do so across all the ques-
tions. 
 
Novice Naturalistic Reasoning (NNR) Pattern 
Based on prior research with children and adults, one clear prediction was that goal di-
rected reasoning (Var. 9) should be positively correlated with the overall NNR pattern and 
negatively correlated with the other two patterns. This was the case. (The pattern of inter-
correlations between the most prevalent NNR themes—variables 7–10—and the overall 
reasoning patterns—variables 11–13—can be found in table 7). 
Moreover, goal-directed reasoning was significantly negatively correlated with the se-
lection theme, which demonstrates that visitors who understood natural selection were 
less likely to use goal-directed language when explaining evolutionary problems. One pos-
sible interpretation of this pattern is that differential survival, which means some individ-
uals in the population die, is incompatible with purpose. Goal-directed reasoning was also 
positively correlated with all the ecological variables: the informed ecological pressures 
theme, as well as the two novice themes, static adaptation (Var. 7), and adaptive features 
(Var. 8). A possible interpretation of this pattern is that for the goal-directed reasoner the 
goal or purpose is adaptation to the environment. Thus the recognition that the environ-
ment is a critical component in evolutionary change appears to be a crucial transitional 
step in the shift from a novice to an informed reasoning pattern. Intentional/mental state 
reasoning was not one of the main themes (mentioned by fewer than 20% of sample), but 
it was positively correlated with goal-directed reasoning (r = 0.48; p < 0.01), particularly 
need-based adaptation (r = 0.52; p < 0.01), and the adaptive feature list (r = 0.46; p < 0.01), 
but not with any of the other variables. 
The significant positive relations between the two NNR themes, static adaptation (Var. 
7) and adaptive features (Var. 8), and common descent, an INR theme, indicates that those 
novice reasoners who acknowledged the importance of the environment also endorsed 
common descent. In addition, the overall negative relationship between the NNR reason-
ing pattern and selection, suggests that they did not grasp the evolutionary mechanism, 
natural selection. Overall, as predicted, the novice reasoner was most likely to suggest 
goal-directed mechanisms of change. 
Proximate cause (Var. 10) reasoning was not diagnostic of any particular reasoning pat-
tern. It appeared to be a causal explanation associated with either evolutionary or creation-
ist reasoning. To have a full explanation for any particular biological phenomena, both 
proximate and evolutionary causes are necessary. What is noticeable in the results de-
scribed in Part I is that participants were more likely to use proximate cause reasoning for 
E V A N S  E T  A L . ,  J O U R N A L  O F  R E S E A R C H  I N  S C I E N C E  T E A C H I N G  4 7 :3  (2 0 1 0 )  
30 
the organisms (virus, diatom, ant, fly) for which they lacked any kind of evolutionary ex-
planation. 
 
Creationist Reasoning (CR) Pattern 
The pattern of intercorrelations between the creationist reasoning pattern (CR) and the 
other variables can be seen in table 7 (Var. 13). As there were few creationist themes, they 
were not presented individually but as a composite variable only. Complicating this rea-
soning pattern, the previous results demonstrate that some participants, who were not Bib-
lical literalists, expressed creationist ideas for the human/chimp question but were 
naturalistic reasoners for the other questions. The few consistent creationist reasoners in 
this sample, who were highly sophisticated Biblical literalists, were very clear that they 
endorsed variation within species but not common descent or geological time. (Unfortu-
nately, with this small sample of creationist reasoners it is not possible to distinguish these 
two groups in the pattern of correlations.) 
Of particular interest was the significant negative relationship between goal-directed 
reasoning and creationist reasoning (see table 6), which was predicted earlier. Creationist 
reasoners did not endorse the idea that goals are intrinsic to the organisms themselves, 
even while they endorse the idea that God created species for an extrinsic purpose (like 
artifacts). Such a pattern is consistent with the theoretical analysis, described in Part I, of a 
dissociation between intentional and goal-directed reasoning, with the former related to 
extrinsic goals (and creationism) and the latter to intrinsic goals (and an intuitive biology). 
Relatedly, the negative relationship between ecological pressures and creationism (see ta-
ble 7) is consistent with the essentialist idea that God created a stable unchanging world. 
It also represents a refusal to acknowledge one of the natural extrinsic causes of speciation 
(and common descent)—environmental change. Finally, this negative relationship pro-
vides support for the decision to code the ecological pressures theme under the informed 
naturalistic reasoning pattern. 
 
General Discussion 
 
If a well-educated population of people who are interested enough to go to a natural his-
tory museum fail to understand basic evolutionary principles, then it bodes ill for the pop-
ulation at large. Unlike the general population, which typically registers 45% against 
evolution (Gallup, 2007), these natural history museum visitors were much less likely to 
reject evolutionary theory. Only 28% indicated discomfort with evolutionary principles. 
This finding accords with reports from museums where visitor studies on the topic of evo-
lution have been conducted (Spiegel et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, while the majority accepted evolutionary ideas, only a third could 
be said to have a reasonable grasp of Darwinian evolutionary mechanisms. Not one visitor 
consistently used evolutionary reasoning to explain all seven problems. This is unlikely to 
be the consequence of a lack of interest in or exposure to the pertinent content. These nat-
ural history museum visitors were more highly educated than the population at large, and 
the pilot study demonstrated that they were also interested in and relatively knowledgea-
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ble about the organisms and concepts presented in the study, to the extent that they pro-
vided biological descriptions of the terms. Moreover, the more frequently they visited nat-
ural history museums, the more likely they were to spontaneously mention evolution 
terms. We shall argue, instead, that consistent with our earlier theoretical analysis, these 
findings result from the conceptual difficulty of Darwinian ideas, which run counter to 
commonsense (Evans, 2001; Bloom & Weisberg, 2007; Mayr, 1982, pp. 514–519). That the 
same pattern of misunderstandings is found among adult museum visitors in Canada and 
Australia, which have a much higher acceptance rate of evolutionary origins, provides 
support for this position (Abrahams-Silver & Kisiel, 2008). Before addressing the implica-
tions these findings might have for informal and formal science education, we summarize 
the overall results and address their theoretical implications. 
 
Overall Findings 
To address the main purpose of this study, in Part I of the analyses we profiled the reason-
ing patterns of museum visitors. This analysis was based on a theoretical model (see fig. 1) 
in which intuitive modes of reasoning, present in childhood, interact with the cultural in-
fluences of religion, especially Biblical literalism, and science to produce distinct reasoning 
patterns. As hypothesized, we found that the typical visitor used mixed patterns of rea-
soning, depending on the organism. 
Visitors who used informed naturalistic reasoning themes when explaining evolution-
ary change in mammals and birds, often used novice naturalistic reasoning themes for in-
vertebrate or microscopic species. The most frequent novice themes were those also found 
in children’s intuitive beliefs (Evans, 2001, 2008), which appear to persist in adulthood. 
Creationist reasoning was used most frequently when explaining human evolution, alone 
or in combination with novice and/or informed naturalistic reasoning. The overlapping 
circles in the model (see fig. 1) capture some of these more nuanced positions: there is no 
single path to an understanding of evolutionary change but many possible transitions. 
Overall, visitors used one or more of these reasoning patterns in different permutations 
across the seven organisms. Seventy-two percent used a combination of informed natural-
istic reasoning and novice naturalistic reasoning to explain the evolutionary problems. Just 
over one-quarter used a combination of creationist reasoning with one or both of the nat-
uralistic reasoning patterns. One third, however, did use informed naturalistic reasoning 
in more than 50% of their responses. These results indicate that about two-thirds of these 
museum visitors were unlikely to spontaneously invoke a Darwinian evolutionary expla-
nation to solve a biological change problem. Of this group, a minority were creationists, 
while the majority invoked novice modes of reasoning. 
Each of the seven organisms elicited a distinctive reasoning pattern. The finch, human, 
and whale were most likely to elicit an evolutionary term, with the finch most likely to 
invoke a selectionist concept. The human and whale questions explicitly addressed mac-
roevolutionary processes and were also the most likely to elicit the common descent theme. 
In contrast with the vertebrates, the ant, fly, diatom, and virus questions were more likely 
to elicit novice naturalistic reasoning, with the latter three organisms often eliciting a prox-
imate cause theme. In these cases, the visitors did not seem to recognize that an evolution-
ary explanation was needed to explain the presence of new species, a pattern also found 
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in childhood (Evans, 2000; Southerland et al., 2001). Creationist reasoners fell into two 
groups. One was a sophisticated vocal minority, who rejected most references to evolution, 
especially common descent, and who explained variation as part of God’s plan. For the 
majority of creationist reasoners, however, their reasoning was organism specific: humans 
were created by God, while the other organisms evolved. 
A common complaint in the science education research literature (e.g., Bishop & Ander-
son, 1990; Greene, 1990) is that students do not understand the importance of chance or 
randomness, so we were interested to see whether visitors would spontaneously evoke 
this concept. Fewer than 20% of the visitors did so. Nor did the idea of sexual selection 
spontaneously occur to any of the visitors, though this is a central concept in fruit fly spe-
ciation. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Bridges to an Evolutionary Understanding? 
In Part II of the analyses, we focused on the coherence of the patterns by assessing the 
interrelationships between themes from the three reasoning patterns. One interpretation 
of these findings was that two themes in particular, goal-directedness and variation, were 
key transitional concepts, bridging the gap between novice reasoning patterns and in-
formed reasoning patterns. 
The finding that creationist reasoners endorsed selection (as differential survival) and 
rejected common descent, while novice naturalistic reasoners endorsed common descent 
but not selection, indicates an interesting disassociation between these two evolutionary 
themes. Further, common descent as well as goal-directed reasoning were positively re-
lated to all ecological variables from both the informed and the novice reasoning patterns. 
As argued earlier, this pattern suggests that novice reasoners who recognized the im-
portance of ecological pressures endorsed common descent but utilized goal-directedness 
as the mechanism of evolutionary change rather than natural selection. In effect, they ex-
pressed pre-Darwinian ideas of evolutionary change. Goal-directed reasoning is a process 
that is intrinsic to the organism, with the goal being adaptation to a changed environment. 
Creationist reasoners, in contrast, did not endorse goal-directed reasoning or the ecological 
variables. 
These findings provide support for the thesis that goal-directed reasoning and the re-
lated recognition of ecological pressures are important bridges to a Darwinian understand-
ing of evolution, particularly natural selection (Evans, 2008). The significant negative 
correlation between goal-directed themes and the selection theme indicates that the latter 
directly supplants the former as the mechanism of change. For the majority of visitors, the 
goal-directed theme was one in which, of necessity, the organism needed to change in or-
der to survive in a changed environment. Importantly, this was not an intentional concept 
that reflected the organism’s conscious desire or intent to change. The latter was coded 
separately from goal-directedness and was rarely expressed by the visitors. As described 
earlier, the ability to distinguish between goal-directed reasoning, from an intuitive biol-
ogy, and intentional (mental state) reasoning, from an intuitive psychology, appears to be 
a crucial step in gaining a handle on evolutionary thinking in childhood (Evans, 2008). 
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Once visitors, of any age, realize that the organism’s survival in a changed environment 
depends on its possession of particular features, then they are in a position to grasp key 
aspects of natural selection: differential survival and differential reproduction. 
Given that these intuitive beliefs appear to constrain current thinking on evolution, it is 
likely that they exerted similar effects in historical contexts. Thus, it would not be surpris-
ing if similar patterns of conceptual change were found historically. Goal-directed reason-
ing, as a progressive theme, was a dominant idea among the assortment of teleological 
evolutionary ideas that were part of the intellectual milieu influencing Darwin (Bowler, 
2009; Chambers, 1994; Mayr, 1982, pp. 47–51). Yet, even in the historical context, it was 
considered important to exclude terms indicating that change came about because of an 
organism’s conscious desire for change. Lamarck, for example, did not endorse wants but 
did endorse needs (Evans, 2001; Kampourakis & Zogza, 2007): “One misconstrual was that 
he [Lamarck] claimed animals have an inherent power to enlarge organs or capacities in 
response to their wants (a misreading of the French besoins)” (Quammen, 2006, p. 71). This 
historical analysis is evidence that an acceptance of evolutionary ideas and an understand-
ing of the mechanisms do not go hand in hand. 
From an essentialist perspective (Mayr, 1982, pp. 304–305), natural kinds (in this case, 
species) are endowed with an underlying essence that gives members of a particular kind 
distinctive features that are stable and unchanging. It follows, therefore, that one kind can-
not change into another, which makes evolutionary change, particularly common descent, 
strongly counterintuitive (Evans, 2000, 2001, 2008; Mayr, 1982). Essentialist beliefs are char-
acteristic of childhood reasoning (Gelman, 2003). Individuals who are strongly essentialist 
tend to focus on features that are common to a species and ignore small differences be-
tween individual organisms. Given this perspective, and in contrast with previous re-
searchers, we coded for a variation concept independently of the idea of randomness. The 
realization that small differences among members of a species are key to differential sur-
vival and reproduction is an important insight, one that does not depend on an under-
standing of the genetic origin of those differences (of which Darwin was ignorant). Of all 
the VIST subconcepts, we found that variation was the one most likely to be mentioned by 
informed naturalistic reasoners, which distinguished them from the novice naturalistic 
reasoners (see also Shtulman & Schulz, 2008). 
In keeping with prior research (Evans, 2000, 2008), this finding suggests that highlight-
ing within-species variation provides an important means of modifying an essentialist per-
spective, one that could provide a bridge between the novice- and informed-naturalistic 
reasoning patterns. There is a crucial caveat: creationist reasoners also endorse variation 
and differential survival but within a different framework. Some visitors in this study 
claimed that God built the capacity for variation into the DNA: “OK, I believe, um, God 
created a pair, a male and female of everything with the ability to diversify”; “God created 
the algae with the DNA to expand into different kinds.” This nuanced means of reconciling 
the obvious fact of within-species variation with a creationist perspective is common 
among members of a sophisticated creationist community (Jones, 2005; Morris & Parker, 
1982). The expression of this diversity is limited to members of a particular kind, where a 
kind is defined, for example, as all wolf-dogs from dachshunds to dingoes. It does not 
extend to change from one kind of animal to another, such as from land animals to whales. 
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The latter change runs counter to the fundamentalist belief that each kind was endowed 
by God with a unique essence (Numbers, 1992), which, it is argued, is a cultural extension 
of the essentialist intuition that species are stable and do not change. 
 
Explanatory Coherence or Fragmentary Knowledge? 
One feature of informed naturalistic reasoning was the rudimentary nature of the 
knowledge base. Such reasoning provided an opportunity to examine the conceptual un-
derpinnings of what have been called fragmented (diSessa et al., 2004) or synthetic con-
cepts (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992), which may well be typical of the layperson’s 
understanding of most scientific topics. Our coding of selection, for example, focused on 
differential survival, rather than differential survival and differential reproduction (the lat-
ter was captured in the inheritance code). The relative strength of the relationships be-
tween the VIST subconcepts and the overall pattern indicates that variation and selection 
(as differential survival) were the most characteristic of the informed reasoning pattern. 
Yet, while the visitors may have accessed the concept of within-species variation and dif-
ferential survival, they did not consistently use this knowledge to explain the diverse evo-
lutionary problems encountered in the study. Nor did they consistently tie their 
knowledge of variation and selection to the other related concepts, inheritance and time. 
Part of the problem was visitors’ failure to recognize that all the biological change prob-
lems that we presented to them were variations on one theme: Darwinian evolution. Often 
their solution was to offer proximate cause explanations rather than ultimate or evolution-
ary cause explanations, especially for invertebrates (Evans, 2001; Southerland et al., 2001; 
Mayr, 1982, p. 67). 
Overall, these findings suggest that in the process of assimilating strongly counterintu-
itive ideas, such as evolutionary concepts, to an intuitive set of beliefs, locally coherent 
models are constructed (Evans et al., in press; Vosniadou et al., 2008). These synthetic 
blends often give the appearance of fragmented beliefs, in the sense that visitors may have 
accessed only one of the VIST subconcepts. But the significant correlations between key 
variables from novice and informed reasoning patterns indicate that the resulting pattern 
was coherent, which might well be typical of synthetic concepts (Vosniadou et al., 2008). 
Conversely, some visitors were clearly struggling, especially those who listed adaptive 
features of organisms but did not tie them sensibly to the question at hand. These were the 
visitors who were more likely to use intentional-mental-state-reasoning, with explanations 
that are best described as fragmented (diSessa et al., 2004). 
In sum, we propose that whether visitors’ reasoning seems fragmented or coherent de-
pends on where they are in their understanding of the problem at hand. They have access 
to multiple representations (Evans, 2000, 2008; Legare & Gelman, 2008) of biological 
change: novice and informed naturalistic models as well as creationist models. How these 
models are integrated and utilized clearly depend on the visitors’ interpretation of the 
problem as well as on the explanatory depth of the underlying knowledge structures. The 
integration of intuitive and cultural (religious or scientific) beliefs is a long process, one 
which might well follow a developmental trajectory. The gap between intuitive and expert 
conceptions appears to be bridged by a variety of transitional concepts, reflecting various 
blends of intuitive, scientific, and creationist ideas (Evans et al., in press). In figure 1, such 
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states are indicated by the overlapping circles. Charting the process of conceptual change 
requires, at a minimum, better theories of how learners manage to integrate multiple mod-
els to solve problems. 
 
Implications for Science Education 
If belief in evolution means simply assenting to microevolution, small changes 
over time within a species, . . . I believe it to be true. [But] Man was not an acci-
dent and reflects an image and likeness unique in the created order. Those as-
pects of evolutionary theory compatible with this truth are a welcome addition 
to human knowledge. (Brownback, 2007) 
 
A key observation from these studies is that the majority of museum visitors do not realize 
that the term evolution applies to both microevolutionary and macroevolutionary pro-
cesses; in fact, they are more likely to apply this term to the latter process. Moreover, as in 
the above quote and seen in these studies, creationist reasoners may accept microevolution 
but not macroevolution, whereas novice naturalistic reasoners may accept the latter but 
misunderstand the former. 
There are several reasons why this disassociation occurs, all of which point to the ne-
cessity of linking the two concepts in a variety of settings. Biomedical researchers appear 
to avoid the “E-word” when describing antibiotic resistance (Antonovics et al., 2007). Sim-
ilarly, while school curricula typically include discussion of within-species change, they 
rarely address macroevolutionary processes or speciation in the biology classroom (Catley 
2006; Poling & Evans, 2004a). One exception may be an introduction to dinosaurs in ele-
mentary school; yet, while young elementary school children may be skilled at classifying 
dinosaurs, this does not mean they understand their role in an evolutionary framework 
(Evans, 2000; Poling & Evans, 2004b). Natural history museums, on the other hand, are the 
repositories of the evidence for macroevolution (Diamond and Scotchmoor, 2006), but they 
do not necessarily explain the mechanisms. More often they present evolution as a linear 
concept, with single individuals from particular lineages linked across geological time (Di-
amond and Scotchmoor, 2006). 
The finding that visitors failed to generalize their understanding of evolution across 
diverse species indicates that they did not realize that evolutionary processes are a funda-
mental attribute of living things, at both the microscopic and the macroscopic level. Bio-
logical change in HIV, for example, is a process that can best be understood using an 
evolutionary lens. The majority of the visitors, however, used intuitive reasoning to ex-
plain the changes. This suggests that public health campaigns, medical schools, and health 
curricula should emphasize an evolutionary perspective when describing such health is-
sues (Nesse & Williams, 1996). Furthermore, exhibitions and curricula that provide oppor-
tunities for generalizing across diverse species are more likely to be successful in relaying 
this fundamental concept. 
Finally, from the theoretical implications outlined above, there are some specific pro-
posals for providing transitions or bridges between intuitive and evolutionary reasoning 
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patterns. Essentialist intuitions should be explicitly challenged by providing multiple ex-
amples of within- and between-species diversity. Change rather than stability is part of the 
natural order. Further, goal-directed concepts should be explicitly decoupled from an in-
tentional reasoning pattern that involves mental state terminology. 
Future research in informal and formal settings should focus on ways of bringing about 
these transitions. One of the limitations of this study is the focus on open-ended interviews 
and visitors’ explanations, which are language-based. One advantage of this procedure, 
however, is that visitors’ explanations revealed their implicit understanding, rather than 
the ability to merely recognize evolutionary concepts. Moreover, we were able to offer de-
tailed quantitative as well as qualitative analyses. Finally, this focus gave us a rich database 
that can be exploited to provide stems for a nuanced set of closed-ended questions that 
explicitly target these core concepts (Spiegel et al., submitted). 
 
Conclusion 
 
These findings highlight the need to help the public understand that microevolutionary 
and macroevolutionary processes occur in all living kinds. While the majority of the mu-
seum-going public might be willing to accept evolutionary origins, it appears that they are 
not familiar enough with the fundamental principles of evolution to understand the mech-
anisms of Darwinian evolutionary change. Understanding and acceptance do not go hand 
in hand, historically, or in contemporary populations, even for those exposed to Darwinian 
evolutionary ideas. For the museum-going public, the normative reasoning pattern ap-
pears to be that of a synthetic blend, a fusion of evolutionary concepts and intuitive beliefs. 
The model presented in this study and these results can be used to help educators, in for-
mal and informal settings, identify the reasoning patterns of their students and visitors 
and the factors that elicit these different reasoning patterns. A single museum visit, or even 
several, are unlikely to effect radical conceptual change. Yet, incremental shifts toward 
more informed naturalistic reasoning could potentially usher in a cascade of more dra-
matic changes. 
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